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I. Introduction 
We are pleased to respond to the “Questions for Public Comment” (“QFPCs”) posed by 
the FTC and DOJ (“Agencies”) on September 22, 2009.  It has been more than a decade 
since the Merger Guidelines’ Efficiencies section has been updated and 17 years since the 
section on Competitive Effects has been revised.  Economics analysis of mergers has
progressed substantially since that time, and merger law has continued to evolve.  
Lawyers and economists with a regular antitrust practice may not require an update in 
light of their knowledge of the 2006 Merger Commentary, speeches and Agency 
experience. But, the rest of the antitrust world does.  For example, it is important to keep 
the courts abreast of what the Agencies believe is “best practice,” based on the Agencies’ 
review of hundreds of mergers each year.  Moreover, as FTC Commissioner William 
Kovacic has stressed in speeches, the world marketplace for antitrust ideas needs to have 
the guidance of the US enforcement agencies. They should not have to ferret it out from
commentaries and speeches. The Merger Guidelines have been the most emulated 
feature of US antitrust enforcement worldwide.  It would be unfortunate to squander the 
leadership role by a failure to stay up-to-date or a failure to keep the world informed. 
Many of the QFPCs are highly interrelated. Therefore, rather than attempting to answer 
the questions one at a time, we will discuss certain issues that hopefully will throw light 
on a number of the questions.  Our comments here also will not attempt to touch on every 
issue or respond to every question raised in the notice.   
The remainder of this submission is organized as follows: Section II discusses issues 
related to the goals of merger analysis.  It also introduces the issue of imperfect 
information and the role of presumptions.  Section III focuses on market definition.  
Section IV focuses on unilateral effects analysis, including the possible role of price 
pressure indices (“PPIs”). Section V provides some brief comments on coordinated 
effects. Section VI provides some brief comments on efficiencies.   
   Professor Salop and Dr. Moresi represent only their own views and not necessarily the views of anyone 
else at Georgetown University Law Center, CRA or elsewhere. We are submitting these comments on our 
own and not on behalf of any client.  We were not commissioned by anyone for preparing these comments.  
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II. The Goals and Structure of Merger Analysis 
We believe there is substantial consensus about the economic goal of merger analysis 
under the Merger Guidelines. That goal is to identify mergers that have a substantial 
likelihood of reducing competition, relative to an appropriate benchmark.  However, 
beyond this general goal, there is more controversy and confusion about the proper scope 
of the analysis.  There also is potential controversy regarding the exact goals of merger 
enforcement, as opposed to simply merger analysis.  We want to begin with some
comments on these issues. 
A. Competitive Effects Generally
The central focus of merger analysis involves competitive effects, that is, predicting the 
likelihood that a merger will reduce competition.  The components of this analysis set out 
in the current Merger Guidelines – market definition; identification of market 
participants; calculation of market shares and concentration; evaluation of potentially 
adverse competitive effects; ease of entry; efficiencies; failing firm – are just the means 
of evaluating the likely competitive effects of the merger.  In particular, market share and 
concentration statistics are one type of circumstantial evidence for predicting the likely 
competitive effects.  They are not the only type of evidence or even necessarily the best
evidence. For example, evidence from “natural experiments” (such as the pricing 
evidence discussed in Staples) might provide far more compelling evidence of likely 
competitive effects than the inference that could be drawn from market shares.  This may 
be true for both high and low market shares.  A longer overview on these issues may be 
warranted in the Guidelines Update. 
B. Exclusionary Conduct
The Merger Guidelines discuss two types of adverse competitive effects – coordinated
effects and unilateral effects. Merger analysis focuses on the ability of a firm or group of 
firms to maintain or raise price (or reduce quality, etc) to an anticompetitive level in the 
post-merger marketplace.  The Merger Guidelines fail to recognize explicitly that an 
additional route to achieving, maintaining or enhancing market power in the post-merger 
world would be to raise the costs of competitors and/or entry barriers, for example, by 
inducing input suppliers (possibly including distributors) to act in ways to disadvantage 
those competitors.2  These cost increases could facilitate adverse coordinated and/or 
unilateral effects.  This may be a significant issue for some mergers.  This analysis also 
explains why and when competitor complaints can be consistent with consumer harm.  
   This outcome might occur if one of the merging parties is vertically integrated.  It also might occur if the 
merging firm will be large enough to be a “power buyer” that can pressure upstream suppliers.  For more 
details on a possible analytic framework, see Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive 
Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209 (1986); Steven C. Salop,
Anticompetitive Overbuying by Power Buyers, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 699 (2005).   
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This latter point is significant because some commentators and courts erroneously infer 
that competitor complaints are a signal that the merger is procompetitive.3 
C. Maintaining Market Power
The Merger Guidelines state that the “unifying theme” is that mergers “should not be 
permitted to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its exercise.” §0.1.  This 
statement omits the idea that mergers also should not be permitted to allow the 
“maintenance” of market power.  This does not appear to be simply careless drafting in 
an otherwise very carefully crafted document.4  Instead, it appears to represent a policy 
choice that pre-merger market power is “grandfathered,” and the only relevant policy 
concern is to ensure that mergers will not “enhance” market power.  This issue is 
exhibited explicitly in the use of the “prevailing price” as the starting point for the 
hypothetical monopolist ssnip test. This methodology also can fall victim to the famous 
Cellophane Fallacy. Both these issues are discussed below.     
D. Optimal Deterrence
As part of its determination of its enforcement decisions, including the “safe harbor” and 
“presumptively anticompetitive” thresholds for the Guidelines Update, it would be useful 
for the Agencies to consider the impact of its standards on deterrence and the optimal 
balancing of the likelihood and magnitude of harms from false positives and false 
negatives. This is not a novel idea. The current Merger Guidelines refer to these issues 
at the end of §0.1. 
Analysis of a particular merger is designed to identify the likelihood that a particular 
merger will lead to anticompetitive effects.  Because merger analysis takes place with 
limited information in a short time frame, there always are concerns about “false 
positives” and “false negatives.”  False negatives include anticompetitive transactions
that are not identified, anticompetitive transactions that are identified but not enjoined by 
the courts, and transactions where the remedy is insufficient.  False positives include 
procompetitive or competitively neutral (but socially beneficial) mergers that are 
enjoined or abandoned as a result of Agency enforcement actions.   
This imperfect information also affects the rates of deterrence.  In analyzing optimal 
deterrence, one would include in the false positives column the potential for 
procompetitive (or competitively neutral but socially beneficial) mergers to be deterred 
3   Judge Posner’s HCA opinion is one example of this reasoning.  Hospital Corporation of America v.
F.T.C., 807 F.2d 1381, 1391-92 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The hospital that complained to the Commission must 
have thought that the acquisitions would lead to lower rather than higher prices – which would benefit
consumers, and hence . . . support the view that the acquisitions were lawful.”). 
4   There also is the issue of mergers that can reduce or eliminate potential competition.  Enforcement in
this areas has fallen into disuse over time, despite its importance in high tech markets where market 
structure in the future can be substantially affected by mergers that take place before products actually are 
introduced into the market.  The Agencies should consider policies to revitalize and clarify its enforcement 
intentions regarding mergers that affect potential competition.   
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by fear of enforcement actions.  It also might include recognition of possible benefits of 
maintaining well-functioning markets for property rights.  A full analysis of deterrence 
also would take into account the costs and potential errors in enforcement, including the 
idea that an over-burdened staff might overlook some anticompetitive mergers or attempt 
to block procompetitive ones with insufficient evidence.     
Deterrrence analysis also would take into account the costs inflicted on merging firms 
and the potential harmful effects of deterring procompetitive mergers by risk-averse 
firms.  Deterrence analysis also would include anticompetitive mergers that are attempted 
and then identified, but inflict administrative costs on the Agencies and the courts.       
Deterrence analysis is complex. Intuition might suggest that false positives would lead to 
over-deterrence and false negatives would lead to under-deterrence.  That is true, but it 
overlooks another very important element: error generally leads to under-deterrence.  To 
illustrate with an extreme example, suppose that the state trooper’s radar gun is imperfect 
so that a driver is equally likely to be ticketed whether going 20 mph under the speed 
limit or 20 mph over the limit or anywhere in-between.  In that case, the likelihood of 
conviction is not related to the driver’s conduct.  The driver might as well exceed the 
speed limit.  After all, the speed does not affect the likelihood of being held liable for 
speeding and going 20 mph below the speed limit might make the driver late for an 
important meeting.  Given these circumstances, why bother slowing down?  As a result, 
there would be under-deterrence.       
The concept of “incipiency” also relates directly to optimal deterrence.  Incipiency was 
interpreted in the past in terms of stopping a trend towards concentration.  But, a more
salient interpretation of incipiency in a modern decision-theoretic analysis might be that 
the Congress premised Section 7 on the view that false negatives (and under-deterrence) 
are a more serious concern than false positives (and over-deterrence).5  The Agencies 
should clarify the role of this balancing in setting out its enforcement intentions.  
Retrospective evaluation of proposed transactions that were permitted, abandoned or 
remedied can provide the Agencies with some information on whether there has been a 
bias towards false negatives or false positives with respect to those transactions.6 
Retrospective analysis of permitted mergers obviously also would be a rich source of
information.  There is also an issue of whether the assumptions underlying the Merger 
Guidelines need revision. One possible issue involves the magnitude of the presumption 
of general efficiency benefits (as distinct from cognizable efficiency benefits established 
5   By way of comparison, the courts today seem to treat false negatives as the more serious problem in the 
case of joint pricing (i.e., price fixing), and false positives as the more serious problem for certain unilateral 
pricing conduct (e.g., predatory pricing and unconditional refusals to deal).
6   For example, a likelihood of significant false negatives might be inferred from the number of 
transactions that are abandoned after issuance of a second request.  Assuming that those firms had been
well counseled, one might wonder whether a number of these were likely anticompetitive transactions that 
nonetheless were attempted in the expectation of a significant likelihood that they would slip though the 
Hart-Scott-Rodino (“HSR”) process without being identified.  (It also might be interesting to track this 
statistic over time.) 
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for a particular merger).  As discussed below, some economic scholarship might be read 
to suggest that mergers are not as driven by efficiencies as seems to have been assumed 
in the 1980s.7 
Deterrence is not just affected by the substantive merger standard.  It also is affected by 
aspects of the merger enforcement process.  The most obvious issue is the agency 
enforcement decision threshold, that is, the minimum expected probability of winning in 
court that the Agencies’ management require in order to justify going to court.  Looking 
over the past 30 years, the previous conventional wisdom was that the Agencies (and 
Agency lawyers) were overly aggressive.  Today, the situation may have become
reversed, with the Agencies being highly risk averse about bringing cases.  
Commentators sometimes look at the won-loss record to evaluate aggressiveness.  But, it 
is well-known from the law and economics literature that the won-loss rate is mostly 
determined by settlement behavior and uncertainty that deters litigation in all but the 
hardest cases when the stakes are symmetric and biases the won-loss record when the 
stakes, litigation costs and degree of risk aversion are asymmetric.8  In that sense, the 
agencies and commentators may be paying too much attention to won-loss rates.  
Settlement procedures also are relevant to deterrence.  For example, a strict requirement 
of fix-it-first with no subsequent settlement negotiations likely would increase the degree 
of deterrence. 
Deterrence also would be affected by the remedial standard.  One remedial standard 
might be to enjoin all incremental elements of a transaction that are incrementally 
welfare-reducing.  A more permissive remedial standard would require divestitures 
sufficient only to prevent overall consumer harm from the merger (rather than lead to 
consumer benefit).9  This latter standard might lead to insufficient deterrence.  With this 
latter standard, merging firms could safely expand the transaction to include certain 
anticompetitive elements, as long as they did not go far as to make the entire transaction 
consumer welfare-reducing.  Coupled with a likelihood that some anticompetitive deals 
would slip through would yield a negative expected welfare effect on average.  This 
raises the question of whether the agencies use this lower remedial standard or whether 
they actually parse all the elements of the transaction to ensure that it maximizes 
consumer welfare, or somewhere in between.    
7   For example, see Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, in
HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK 235, 256 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008). 
8   For example, see George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984), and the literature generated by their article. 
9   To illustrate, consider the following abstract example.  Suppose that a divestiture of X% of an
overlapping product line in the relevant market would prevent the merger from causing consumer harm
(relative to the pre-merger situation), but a divestiture of Y%>X% of the overlapping product line would
maximize consumer welfare. In this sense, the part of the merger that involves the (Y-X)% increment in
the merger reduces consumer welfare at the margin.  Requiring the divestiture of Y% instead of X% would
increase consumer welfare at the margin. 
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While these issues have not been made explicit in the Merger Guidelines, liability and 
remedial standards should be interrelated.  For example, if the merger remedy process is 
weak, then tougher substantive standards would be required to achieve optimal 
deterrence, or vice versa. Thus, analysis of these issues and the potential reforms should 
be considered as part of the Update process. 
E. Imperfect Information and Relevant Market Definition
The QFPCs ask for comments about the hypothetical monopolist ssnip test. In our view, 
that test is an elegant but complicated and imperfect methodology.  The QFPCs (and our 
comments here) provide a list of potential criticisms.  Other commentators no doubt will 
offer additional criticisms.  However these criticisms are resolved in the Guidelines 
Update, these criticisms add up to an important theme: market definition will often yield 
ambiguous results.  It might make sense to explicitly concede this point in the Guidelines 
Update. 
That is, the Guidelines Update could recognize that market definition is an imperfect 
exercise in which the “most appropriate” market definition is sometimes unclear.  There 
may not be convincing evidence for a unique “most appropriate” market, as opposed to a 
substantial “likelihood” that one or another market definition is appropriate.10  The 
concession of this point would nudge both the Merger Guidelines and the law to focus 
more solidly on the bottom line issue of likely competitive effects.  Of course, the 
decision to downgrade the role of concentration and market shares cuts both ways.  On 
the one hand, it obviously would weaken the Philadelphia National Bank (“PNB”) 
structural presumption of harm.  On the other hand, it may not be recognized that it also 
would weaken the case for safe harbors based on market share and concentration.     
We are not suggesting that market definition be excised from merger analysis.  Section 7 
of the Clayton Act requires one or more lines of commerce and sections of the country to 
be defined. Market shares and concentration also retain relevance for predicting 
competitive effects.  But, we expect that there is a virtual consensus that market shares
and concentration (the results of market definition) are mainly valued for helping to 
analyze competitive effects, not as an end in and of itself.  This recognition should be 
made explicit in the Guidelines Update.   
We discuss market definition analysis in more detail in Section III below. 
F. Initial Screens, Safe Harbors and Structural Presumptions
This discussion of possibly downgrading the importance of market shares and 
concentration (and thus rendering the market definition chosen less of a do-or-die 
determination) raises the issue of the four distinct ways in which market share and 
concentration are used in the merger enforcement process.  (Of course, other factors such 
10  On this point, see Michael Katz & Howard Shelanski, Merger Analysis and the Treatment of
Uncertainty: Should We Expect Better?, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 537 (2007). 
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as the UPP test or the GUPPI measure discussed below also could be used in these four 
ways, as discussed in Section IV.) 
First, PNB and subsequent cases discuss the role of market share and concentration in 
forming a legal presumption that a transaction is anticompetitive, that is, a rebuttable 
presumption that shifts the burden to the merging parties to explain why the merger is not 
anticompetitive.   
Second, the Merger Guidelines use market shares and concentration for setting the 
enforcement threshold for identifying mergers as presumptively non-harmful, including 
irrebuttable (or virtually irrebuttable) safe harbors. 
Third, the Merger Guidelines use market shares and concentration for setting the 
threshold for identifying mergers as presumptively anticompetitive, that is, mergers that 
will lead to an enforcement action if not rebutted by exculpatory evidence provided by
the merging parties.  This enforcement presumption is different from the PNB legal 
presumption because it involves only the Agencies’ enforcement decision.11  (As 
discussed in Section IV below, when there is a sliding scale, there could be multiple 
levels of enforcement presumptions, with different burdens placed on the Agencies and 
the merging parties.) 
Fourth, the Merger Guidelines and the courts use market shares and concentration as one 
type of probative circumstantial evidence for determining the likelihood of adverse 
competitive effects.  In this regard, there is other circumstantial evidence and also the 
potential for direct evidence, and the non-market share evidence may be more 
compelling. 
In the 1992 Merger Guidelines, there are two safe harbors, HHI<1000 and HHI<1800/ 
ΔHHI<100. (However, the safe harbors are not absolute; the Guidelines state only that 
“ordinarily” such mergers require no further analysis. §1.51.)  The threshold for a 
“presumptively anticompetitive” transaction involves HHI>1800/ΔHHI>100. For 
unilateral effects, a combined market share of the merging firms of less than 35% might 
be a safe harbor, or a market share exceeding 35% might be considered presumptively 
anticompetitive, or neither; no one can really tell from reading the current Merger 
Guidelines at §2.211. 
It appears that the Agencies’ de facto safe harbor in the previous administration was an 
HHI significantly exceeding 1800.  Some leading practitioners have suggested informally 
that the threshold for identifying a merger as presumptively anticompetitive was either 4-
to-3 or perhaps even 3-to-2 (plus a fringe of much smaller companies), though we are 
sure that there could be debate on that issue.12 
11  Of course, the legal presumption and the enforcement presumption are related and could converge over
time.   
12  For the review of some data from the 2001-2005 period, see Andrew I. Gavil, William E. Kovacic & 
Jonathan B. Baker, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE (2nd Edition) 516 (2002). 
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It is clear that the legal presumption based on market share/concentration has been 
dramatically weakened over time.  In Baker-Hughes, for example, future Supreme Court 
Justices Thomas and Ginsburg characterized concentration as nothing more than a 
“convenient starting point” for merger analysis.13  If there is a structural presumption 
today, it certainly is much higher than the approximately 35% combined market share in 
PNB. In Heinz, 14 the D.C. Circuit applied a strong presumption to a combined share of 
35%, but that involved what the appeals court saw as essentially a 3-to-2 merger.    
We assume that part of the Guidelines Update will be to revise the safe harbor and 
“presumptively anticompetitive” enforcement thresholds.  In this regard, there obviously 
is no reason why either the safe harbors or the structural presumption must be solely 
based on market shares and concentration, rather than other variables.  We assume that 
the Guidelines Update may formulate thresholds for unilateral effects concerns that are 
based on price pressure indices (“PPIs”) – either to supplement or to replace the HHI and 
market share thresholds in the 1992 Merger Guidelines.  Perhaps a safe harbor based on 
ease of entry also will be added explicitly.  Economic analysis by Farrell & Shapiro15 of 
their UPP test (and earlier articles by Werden,16 O’Brien & Salop,17 and others) suggests 
the relevance of using a PPI for mergers that raise unilateral effects concerns.18  We will 
discuss these PPIs in more detail in Section IV.
III. The Hypothetical Monopolist SSNIP Test for Market Definition
As mentioned above, the hypothetical monopolist ssnip test is an elegant but complicated 
and imperfect methodology.  The design and/or implementation of the ssnip test
13  United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 984 (1990).  
14  FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 716-17 (2001).  We were economic consultants to the merging
parties for this transaction.
15  Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to
Market Definition, Working Paper, 25 November 2008 (UC Berkeley Dept. of Econ.), available at
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/alternative.pdf. 
16  Gregory Werden, A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers Among Sellers of
Differentiated Products, 44 J. INDUS. ECON. 409 (1996).
17  Daniel O’Brien & Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and
Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 559 (2000).  
18 Werden calculates the compensating marginal cost reductions (“CMCRs”) for the merging products that 
would ensure that prices would not change post-merger.  The CMCRs are PPIs in the sense that higher 
values of the CMCRs indicate larger potential unilateral effects (in the absence of efficiencies, repositioning
and entry).  Farrell & Shapiro propose an upward pricing pressure (“UPP”) test for each of the merging
products.  The UPP test is a binary PPI that indicates whether the price of a product is subject to upward or 
downward pressure (in the absence of repositioning and entry, but accounting for an “efficiency credit”). 
 O’Brien & Salop propose a PPI for each of the merging products that under certain conditions measures 
the magnitude of the potential unilateral effects (again, in the absence of efficiencies, repositioning and 
entry). 
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definitely need some renovation after all these years.  In this section, we will discuss
several areas where some updating would be helpful. 
A. Smallest Market Principle
The “smallest market principle” (“SMP”) clearly should be erased.  First, the SMP 
erroneously suggests that a careful application of the ssnip test will identify one and only 
one relevant market (for each product sold by the merging parties).  That outcome is not 
the case in practice. The Guidelines counsel the analyst to begin with one of the products 
of one of the merging firms.  Even if each of the merging firms produces a single brand 
of a single product, the separate starting points (one for each firm) and the ssnip
algorithm often may lead to two separate “smallest” markets.  The situation is even worse 
once non-uniform price increases are considered.  The ssnip test permits the analyst to 
evaluate a uniform price increase or a price increase only for some products within the 
proposed market. Depending on the pricing assumption, a different smallest market may 
emerge.  Finally, the Merger Guidelines envision the possibility of price discrimination 
markets, whereby prices are increased only to certain customers or groups of customers.  
This pricing assumption could lead to a yet different smallest market.   
Second, in combination with the algorithm for expanding the candidate market, the SMP 
also can significantly distort the analytic process.  When an iteration of the ssnip test 
finds that the ssnip would be unprofitable, the Merger Guidelines direct the analyst to 
“add to the product group the product that is the next-best substitute for the merging 
firm's product.” §1.11.  The identification of the next-best substitute can make a huge
difference to the outcome of the market definition algorithm.  For example, suppose that 
pens vary along a price/quality continuum. Consider a merger involving a mid-level pen 
brand. On the one hand, if the very next-best substitute is a lower price/quality brand, the 
algorithm may drive the market definition to a “low end” pen market.  On the other hand, 
if the very next-best substitute is a higher price/quality brand, the algorithm may drive the 
market definition to a “high end” pen market.  Which brand of pen is the very next-best 
substitute clearly could be a very close call. Yet, this decision could make a huge 
difference if the algorithm drives the market expansion process in one direction rather 
than another. Indeed, it could determine whether of not the merging parties even are 
placed in the same market.   
Third, and most important, the SMP makes no sense as a matter of policy.19  A finding 
that there are no significant competitive concerns in the most narrow possible market 
definition does not mean that there are no concerns in a broader market.  To illustrate,
consider a proposed merger between Heinz and Beech-Nut.  Suppose that the ssnip test 
found a narrow market for premium baby food comprised of just Gerber and Beech-Nut, 
a narrow market that does not include Heinz.  Suppose that it also found another narrow 
19  For a similar view, see Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytic Overview, 74 ANTITRUST 
LAW JOURNAL 129, 148 (2007). 
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market for Gerber and Heinz that does not include Beech-Nut.20  Those two market 
definitions do not imply that a merger between Beech-Nut and Heinz necessarily would 
be free of significant competitive issues, involving either unilateral or coordinated 
effects. That is, there might be competitive problems in a market comprised of all three 
brands. For example, suppose that the concern were coordinated effects.  A finding that 
coordination between Gerber and Beech-Nut likely would not be undone by the fear of 
competition from Heinz obviously does not imply that bringing Heinz into the 
coordination as a third participant would have little or no incremental effect on the 
likelihood of success or the magnitude of the coordinated price increase.  With respect to 
unilateral effects, a finding that Gerber and Beech-Nut satisfy the ssnip test does not 
mean that competition between Beech-Nut and Heinz is so minimal that there could be
little or no significant adverse unilateral effects from a Beech-Nut/Heinz merger.21 
Fourth, it is not clear what purpose the SMP serves today. In 1982, there was a concern 
about gerrymandered markets, defined using mushy Brown Shoe22 factors, solely in order 
to produce high market shares.  Therefore, it was suggested, a rigorous and mechanical 
algorithm was needed to prevent the gerrymandering.  Even if this provided the rationale 
for the algorithm in 1982, it does not explain the rationale for the SMP.  The 
gerrymandering involved overly narrow markets, not overly broad markets.23  And, in 
any event, this rationale is no longer relevant even for the algorithm.  Merger analysis has 
become far more rigorous in the last 27 years, partly from what was learned by the 
discipline of the ssnip test.  Now that the lesson has been learned, the crutch of the 
mechanical algorithm and the SMP is no longer needed.     
Both the pen example and this observation about gerrymandered markets make a larger 
point about the role of market definition in the merger review process.  Market definition 
is an either/or bright line decision.  Either two products are in the same market or they are 
not. There is no continuum of higher and lower likelihood.  This is not a problem where 
there is a huge break in the chain of substitutes, say in the case of geographic markets for 
supermarkets in Wyoming.  But, often the chain of substitution does not involve huge 
breaks. Moreover, the quantitative estimates of cross-elasticities of demand and own-
20  This example also makes another point.  A particular product can be placed in multiple markets.  The 
antitrust market definition exercise does not divide up the world into a set of immutable mutually exclusive 
markets, in which a particular product can only be placed in a single relevant market.  
21 We have heard the argument that the SMP is an anomaly that can be easily handled simply by increasing 
the size of the ssnip. We do not think that this is a good solution.  Raising the ssnip also may bring in
additional products, so it may lead to an overly broad market.  In response, it might be argued that the ssnip
should only be increased when it is discovered that the SMP is leading to an overly narrow market.  But, 
that response is circular.  If it is known that the market is too narrow by the test, then there must be another 
better test being used.  
22  Brown Shoe Co. v United States, 370 U.S. 294, __ (1962)
23  The algorithm for broadening the market when the ssnip test indicates an unprofitable price increase can 
be a useful tool.  But, as illustrated with the pen example, following it slavishly can distort the analysis.  
And, there also is no reason to be constrained by the tool.  If a merger raises competitive concerns in a 
market that satisfies the ssnip test of profitability, then it raises concerns.  The concerns exist regardless of
whether a particular mechanical path was taken to reach that valid market definition.  
10 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
      
   
elasticities of demand are noisy, if they are estimated at all.  Other evidence of reasonable 
interchangeability also generally is imperfect or ambiguous, and often highly subjective.  
In these situations, merger analysis (indeed, all of antitrust) should not place so many 
eggs in the market share basket.   
B. The Cellophane Fallacy and the “Prevailing Price” Benchmark
It is well known that the standard application of the ssnip test falls victim to a variant of 
the Cellophane Fallacy when there is pre-merger tacit or express coordination taking 
place. For example, consider a hypothetical merger between the only two airlines serving 
a small city located 60 miles from a larger city with a much larger airport .  Suppose that 
those airlines are able to successfully tacitly coordinate, so that their prices are set just
below the price that would cause travelers to drive to the larger city airport.  In that 
situation, the relevant market would be found by the ssnip test to include the many flights 
originating at the larger city airport.  As a result, the market share of the two small 
airlines might be so small that their merger would fall into the HHI safe harbor.   
If there is highly successful tacit coordination, the actual loss necessarily would exceed 
the critical loss because the firms already have achieved the profit-maximizing price.  
Indeed, this is precisely how the Cellophane Fallacy was committed in the DuPont
case.24  A standard critical loss analysis would find that a ssnip above the tacitly 
coordinated price would be unprofitable, which would imply that the group of products is 
not a relevant market under the ssnip test. The market then would be broadened beyond 
the tacitly coordinating group. 
This analysis raises both a policy issue and a practical issue.  The policy issue is whether 
or not merger enforcement should “grandfather” pre-merger market power and market 
conditions.25  The parties might argue that the airline merger would not have any adverse 
incremental effects on consumers – because coordination is easy and the parties are 
already successfully tacitly coordinating. 
The flaw in the parties’ argument is that economics teaches that tacit coordination often is  
neither perfect nor durable. Coordination can break down as market conditions change.  
Or, mistakes might be made that set off “pesky” price wars.  Coordination also may be 
imperfect when information and trust are not perfect.  As a result, grandfathering the 
current structure can allow coordination to be perfected and can eliminate the potential 
for the market outcome to improve.  The current Merger Guidelines suggest that 
grandfathering is not a blanket policy. The Merger Guidelines state that the prevailing
price will not be used for the ssnip test when “premerger circumstances are strongly 
suggestive of coordinated interaction.” §1.11 (emphasis added). 
24 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
25  As noted above, the current Merger Guidelines do not include the goal of preventing the “maintenance” 
of market power. 
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The practical issue is the following: what finding would be required to hold that the 
evidence is “strongly suggestive.”  A history of express collusion is the easy case.  But, 
what about the scenario of tacit coordination.  What is the required evidence?  For 
example, suppose that high pre-merger margins are earned by firms with excess capacity 
selling products that are not highly differentiated.  These facts might suggest the 
existence of tacit coordination. Should that evidence be sufficient to be called “strongly 
suggestive?”  Or, would more evidence from the coordination “checklist” be required in 
order to draw that conclusion?  When firms each produce a single differentiated product, 
would prices exceeding Bertrand equilibrium prices raise a sufficiently strong suspicion 
of tacit coordination?26  It is not clear what standards and evidence the agencies are 
utilizing for this issue.  We recommend that the Agencies include this issue on their 
Update agenda. Falling victim to the Cellophane Fallacy is not just embarrassing.  It is 
also bad policy. 
There is also an issue of how to determine the relevant market and calculate market 
shares when there is evidence of tacit coordination.  If the “prevailing price” is not used 
for the ssnip test, what price benchmark should be used?  One obvious candidate is the 
prevailing price minus a ssnip. In that scenario, the ssnip would involve a price increase 
up to the current price level. That price increase would be profitable, virtually by 
definition since the coordinating group could have chosen a lower price.  This means that 
the group of products sold by the established competitors would satisfy the profitability 
condition for finding a relevant market.  The relevant participants thus would be limited 
solely to the current producers.  The relevant participants would not include 
“uncommitted entrants” who would enter only if the price were raised by a ssnip above 
the current price. The relevant market shares would be the actual market shares of the 
established producers. 
C. Differentiated Products
As discussed above with respect to the Cellophane Fallacy, high pre-merger margins can 
signal successful tacit coordination.  However, there are other explanations for high pre-
merger margins.  One standard explanation is differentiated products. As stressed in the 
articles by Katz & Shapiro27 and O’Brien & Wickelgren28 (collectively, “KSOW”), high 
pre-merger margins also can signal low own-elasticities of demand for the individual 
differentiated products. 
Of course, if this is the case, then it would be useful to take this information into account 
in carrying out the ssnip test. In this regard, KSOW have proposed a methodology that 
takes into account the information about demand elasticity contained in the price/cost 
26  As discussed below, when multi-product firms sell imperfect substitute products (possibly outside the 
relevant market), the analysis is more complicated. 
27  Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Critical Loss: Let’s Tell the Whole Story, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003, at
49;
28  Daniel P. O’Brien & Abraham L. Wickelgren, A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis, 71 
ANTITRUST L.J. 161 (2003). 
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margins of short-run profit-maximizing Bertrand competitors, each of whom sell as a 
single product. 
This is not to say that the simple form of the KSOW test is perfect for every market 
situation where the firms are not coordinating.  The simple KSOW test assumes that each 
firm produces only a single product and maximizes short-term profits in Bertrand 
competition.  Applying the test to multi-product firms or to firms that maximize long-
term profits requires a somewhat different market definition condition.  KSOW have 
suggested that the exact form of the test might be changed to take into account alterative 
structural assumptions.  But, whatever the exact form of the test, it is clear that using all 
the available information – on demand substitution, supply-side factors that affect the 
residual demand curve, and the nature of the competitive process within the industry
under consideration that affects pricing – makes economic sense.  At the same, the fact 
that the exact test differs according to structural conditions that may be difficult to 
estimate perfectly is another reason why the importance of market definition and market 
shares might be downgraded.   
This KSOW methodology also raises another key issue.  The KSOW methodology tends 
to lead to narrower markets than often are found now.29  This raises the question of 
whether this is the desired outcome or whether it implies that the ssnip level should be 
raised to compensate. Of course, this decision also is bound up with the issue of the 
strength of the market share presumption that will be adopted in the Guidelines Update.  
And, the decision obviously also is bound up with the deterrence issues raised earlier. 
D. Multi-Product Firms 
Another determinant of the price/cost margin in a differentiated products market is the set 
of products sold by the competing firms.  Multi-product firms selling imperfect substitute 
products would tend to charge higher prices than single-product firms (ceteris paribus). 
Multi-product firms selling complementary products would tend to charge lower prices.  
Properly implementing the ssnip test requires an understanding of multi-product market 
structure. 
1. Substitutes 
When a firm sells multiple products that are substitutes, the firm will tend to charge 
higher prices. Consider a hypothetical pen manufacturer that sells both premium fountain 
pens and premium ballpoint pens.  That firm might reason that if it reduces the price of its 
fountain pens, most of its additional sales would be gained at the expense of other 
premium fountain pen makers, but some would come from its own sales of premium
ballpoint pens. That cannibalization of its own sales would deter it from reducing price 
(and incentivize it to raise price), relative to an otherwise identical firm that sold only 
premium fountain pens.   
29  In fact, coupled with the SMP, it may often be the case that the merging firms would not be placed in the 
same relevant market.   
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This has important implications for the ssnip test for a possible premium fountain pen 
market.  Suppose a number of the pen makers actually sell both types of pens.  That fact 
implies that the prevailing price of premium fountain pens also reflects the impact on 
premium ballpoint profits too.  But, the Merger Guidelines instruct the merger analyst to 
assume that the hypothetical monopolist is “the only present and future producer or seller 
of those products in that area.” § 1.0.  We interpret that instruction to mean that the 
hypothetical monopolist would be selling premium fountain pens only (not both premium
fountain pens and premium ballpoint pens).30  Thus, the prevailing prices chosen by the 
multi-product firms might well exceed the profit-maximizing price by a hypothetical 
monopolist that sold only premium fountain pens.  As a result, the ssnip test is more 
likely to find that the premium fountain pen price increase is unprofitable and thus 
broaden the market, possibly to include all pens, or possibly to include other writing 
implements as well.  This might suggest in turn that the proper implementation of the 
ssnip test would begin with a price below the pre-merger prevailing price.   
An adjustment also must be made to the KSOW test.  KSOW use the prevailing margins 
to infer (or estimate) the magnitude of the own-price elasticity of demand for pens faced 
by each manufacturer.  In the model with single-product firms used by KSOW, the own-
price elasticity is simply equal to the inverse of the prevailing margin.  However, when 
firms sell multiple products that are imperfect substitutes – say, premium fountain pens 
and premium ballpoint pens – the inverse of the prevailing margin understates the 
magnitude of the own-price elasticity.31  If one does not account for this inference 
problem, the KSOW approach would tend to introduce a bias toward finding that a ssnip 
(above prevailing prices) would be profitable, and hence a bias toward defining markets 
that are too narrow (if one uses prevailing prices as the starting point).32 
2. Complements
Analogous issues arise when manufacturers produce complementary products.  For 
example, suppose that a firm produces and sells two complementary products, (say) pens 
and paper, in oligopoly markets.  That firm generally will sell its pens at a lower price 
30  The current Guidelines also instruct us to implement the hypothetical monopolist test “assuming that the 
terms of sale of all other products are held constant.” § 1.0.  This also suggests that the hypothetical
monopolist would be selling only fountain pens.  
31  The understatement of the own-price elasticity leads to a critical aggregate diversion ratio that is too 
low.  This can be verified by following the calculations in Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Improving 
Critical Loss Analysis, ANTITRUST SOURCE (February 2008).  The bias however can be eliminated by
extending the KSOW approach to a setting with multi-product firms.  For further details, see Serge Moresi,
Steven C. Salop & John Woodbury, Implementing the Hypothetical Monopolist SSNIP Test With Multi-
Product Firms, ANTITRUST SOURCE (February 2008) (hereafter, “MSW”).  Note that MSW use 
prevailing prices and thus do not account for the Cellophane issue.
32  Thus, if the KSOW test were implemented using prevailing prices, there would be two biases that work
in opposite directions.  On the one hand, because prevailing margins are “too high,” the KSOW test would
tend to define a market that is too narrow, because of the inference problem.  On the other hand, because 
prevailing prices are “too high,” the KSOW test would run the risk of defining a market that is too broad
because of the Cellophane issue. 
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than it would if it did not also sell paper, ceteris paribus. This is because a lower price 
for pens increases the firm’s sales of paper as well as its sales of pens.33 
Now consider the ssnip test for a putative market comprised of pens only.  Since the 
hypothetical monopolist is assumed to sell pens but not paper, it would have an incentive 
to raise the price of pens above the prevailing price because it does take into account the 
impact on paper profits.  Indeed, if the complementarity is significant, this procedure in 
principle could lead to the result of a relevant market comprised solely of the pens sold 
by a single firm.  This, of course, would not be a very helpful market definition and is 
another illustration of the problems raised by the SMP.  Accordingly, the Guidelines 
Update should clarify whether the ssnip test should be applied to the prevailing prices of 
pens – in which case the market definition exercise must account for the fact that the 
ssnip test tends to delineate markets that are too narrow – or whether the ssnip test should 
use different prices above the prevailing prices.34 
3. Conclusions
To summarize, market definition in industries with multi-product firms raises important 
issues that need to be addressed in the Guidelines Update.  These issues in principle can 
be analyzed by extending the framework of the hypothetical monopolist test in various 
ways. We list three options in the note.35  However, we want to emphasize the fact that 
this issue is one more complexity that makes market definition less exact in practice.  It is 
one more reason to focus less on market shares and more on other competitive effects 
evidence. 
E. Price Discrimination Markets
We agree that price discrimination markets often are relevant to understanding the 
competitive effects of mergers.  This is particularly the case in the sale of individually 
negotiated intermediate products.  Once the SMP is dropped, then analysts and courts 
may feel less tension about there being what might be seen as a broad market for the 
product generally and narrower price discrimination markets for particular customers.  
33  This is often referred to as the “Cournot Complements” effect.   
34  If the ssnip test were implemented using the KSOW approach and prevailing margins, ignoring the
inference problem discussed above would lead the analyst to overstate the magnitude of the own-price 
elasticity and thus understate the profitability of a ssnip. Again, the KSOW test based on prevailing prices 
would involve two biases that work in opposite directions. 
35  In this regard, we see three possible options.  First, the ssnip test could use prevailing prices as the 
starting point, and assume that the hypothetical monopolist owns the other substitutes or complements, but
does not change the prices of those “outside goods.”  Second, it could be assumed that the hypothetical
monopolist owns only the products under consideration, and the ssnip test could use prices that are not 
equal to prevailing prices – higher (for complements) or lower (for substitutes).  Third, the issue could be
ignored (whereby prevailing prices would be used and the hypothetical monopolist would be assumed not
to sell the other substitutes or complements), and then the market shares could simply be ignored in the 
competitive effects analysis.  
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(Indeed, this might be a place where the discredited term sub-markets actually may be 
useful.) 
However, we recognize that this concept of separate markets or submarkets might be 
confusing to non-specialists. In this regard, another possible usage would be to define 
the broader relevant market and then focus the competitive effects analysis on those 
particular customers that would be targeted for higher discriminatory or negotiated prices.  
It is never the case that every consumer in a market is harmed or harmed equally by an 
anticompetitive merger.  The same may be true for mergers in negotiated product 
markets.  Some customers may be harmed while others may be able to protect 
themselves. 
This same point applies to the role of “big buyers” in market definition and coordinated 
effects analysis. A few big buyers may be sufficient to deter tacit coordination and 
thereby protect all the buyers.  But, that is not necessarily the case.  Sometimes the big 
buyers can prevent themselves from being charged higher prices, but smaller customers 
still may suffer a price increase.   
Indeed, an analogous issue arises in market definition if only a single sized ssnip is 
contemplated and analyzed.  A small ssnip might be unprofitable because of the loss of
the more “mobile” customers.  The additional profits earned from the “captive” 
customers may be insufficient to offset the loss of the “mobile” customers.  However, a 
larger ssnip might be profitable because the additional profits earned from the captive 
customers would increase. 
IV. Unilateral Competitive Effects
It is clear that the Unilateral Effects section also needs revision.  One need go no further 
than the garbled description of the impact of a 35% combined market share in the current 
Merger Guidelines. §2.211.  After this part is revised and clarified, we will mourn the 
lost opportunity of reading it to students.  What a fabulous example of drafting by a 
committee in conflict!  But, the offsetting benefit is that students, the courts and others 
may actually understand the enforcement intentions of the agencies, including the issue 
of whether or not there is a safe harbor or anticompetitive presumption.  
We begin with a few comments on repositioning and entry, and then discuss the role of 
“price pressure indices” for predicting potential unilateral effects.     
A. Repositioning and Entry
The Unilateral Effects section should clarify the role of repositioning and required 
evidence to support repositioning claims.36  The 2006 Merger Commentary suggests that 
36  The Agencies also might consider a new umbrella descriptive term.  Repositioning often involves brand 
extensions or the addition of optional new features rather than elimination of the previous product design
and replacement by a different product design.  
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repositioning is seldom, if ever, sufficient to eliminate concerns. Coupled with tight 
agency standards towards cognizable efficiency benefits, this has led to a longstanding 
concern among commentators and practitioners that virtually every differentiated 
products merger could be said to raise a significant danger of adverse unilateral effects.  
It is important to clarify the Agencies’ enforcement stance.
One possibility is that the perceived resistance to repositioning claims primarily involves 
an evidentiary issue. For example, we have consulted on consumer products mergers 
where there was substantial evidence of continuous brand extensions and brand 
repositioning by numerous competitors in the pre-merger world.  In this situation, it 
would be hard to resist the notion that post-merger price increases in a product niche 
would lead to a high likelihood of responsive brand extension or repositioning by others.  
It is possible that the market structure or technology has changed, but absent such 
information, a tentative conclusion of “easy repositioning” would seem reasonable. 
The likelihood of repositioning may be much less clear if there never had been brand 
extensions or other forms of repositioning in the pre-merger world.  Under those 
conditions, a claim of rapid and easy repositioning might be seen as speculative, absent 
supportive evidence from the firms alleged to have potential to reposition.37  Showing 
that repositioning would be rapid and impediment-free obviously also would be 
important.  The burden might be placed on the merging firms to explain why history does 
not provide reliable evidence, rather than simply assuming that a history of competition 
has never presented a repositioning opportunity. 38 
Repositioning by rivals is a type of supply-side response like entry.  The same debate 
about the role of historical evidence arises with respect to entry.  A history of entry in 
response to demand growth or other market conditions strongly suggests the potential for 
entry in the post-merger market, and it complements the engineering and economic 
evidence of timeliness and likelihood.  The real question is the opposite implication:  
does the lack of entry in the past imply that there likely are significant impediments to 
entry to prevent entry from preventing post-merger competitive harm?  This is not 
necessarily the case. As observed by the court in Waste Management, the lack of entry 
could be the result of easy entry: incumbents were deterred from attempting to set supra-
competitive prices out of a fear of entry.39 
However, this answer is facile and actually implies the need for further analysis.  
Otherwise, one could get lost in the conundrum that a history of entry must imply supra-
37  The credibility of their testimony might be questioned for the usual reasons. 
38 We also note that the current Merger Guidelines focus on repositioning by the rivals of the merging 
firms.  The merged firm also could reposition its product offerings post-merger, a competitive effect that 
might be significant in some mergers. We do not know whether it is common for merging firms to claim
they will engage in such efficiency-enhancing repositioning, but it they do, the claim should not be treated
as non-cognizable.  However, we note that such repositioning dynamics might be quite complicated to
analyze. For example, see Amit Gandhi, Luke M. Froeb, Steven T. Tschantz & Gregory Werden, Post-
Merger Product Repositioning, 56 J. INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 49 (2008).
39 United States v. Waste Management, Inc. and Allied Waste Industries, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (1984).
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competitive prices and entry barriers, while a lack of entry implies easy entry and 
competitive prices.  Of course, one path out of the conundrum is the observation that 
entry does not occur solely in response to supra-competitive pricing.  Entry also may 
occur in response to changes in preferences, demand growth, innovation and so on.  Thus, 
to rebut a record of no entry in (say) a growing or dynamic market, it would be helpful to 
see evidence, for example, that the incumbent firms anticipated and responded to market 
changes faster than potential entrants. As with many claims, more confident resolution of 
the issue requires more substantial factual analysis.   
B. Predicting Unilateral Effects With Price Pressure Indices 
There are alternative methodologies for gauging the magnitude of potential unilateral 
effects, both at the screening stage and in the ultimate inquiry.  Economists for years have 
used merger simulation models for estimating potential unilateral effects.  As mentioned 
earlier, articles by Werden, O’Brien & Salop, and Farrell & Shapiro also have proposed 
the use of price pressure indices (“PPIs”) to aid this analysis.  These methodologies rely 
on information about diversion ratios, margins and efficiency benefits. In principle, they 
also could include information on supply side responses (such as entry and 
repositioning).
In these comments, we will focus on the role of these PPIs in competitive effects 
analysis. We do not envision these PPIs as eliminating a role of other evidence for 
evaluating potential unilateral effects, including both qualitative evidence and merger 
simulation models.  However, because of the great interest in price pressure indices in the 
QFPCs and the antitrust community, these comments will focus on the indices. 
1. The GUPPI
One can conceptualize the unilateral effects of a merger on consumer prices as a conflict 
between two opposing forces of upward and downward pricing pressure.  The elimination 
of competition between the competing products of the merging firms generates upward 
pricing pressure. The efficiency benefits generate downward pricing pressure.40 
The upward pricing pressure depends on the closeness of competition between the 
products of the merging firms, relative to other products inside and outside the relevant 
market, the price/cost margins and other factors.41  In particular, the upward pricing 
pressure may be mitigated by the existence of other close substitutes and by supply-side 
responses (i.e., entry and repositioning). Other long-term or dynamic considerations, 
such as network effects and learning by doing also might exacerbate the upward pricing 
40  For cost-savings, the downward price pressure involves the nominal price.  For quality improvements, 
the downward price pressure involves the quality-adjusted price. 
41   Measuring the price/cost margin raises all the usual issues about the proper measure of cost.  However, 
these clearly are not fatal concerns for the UPP or GUPPI.  In fact, what is peculiar about criticisms based
on cost measurement concerns is that an estimate of the price/cost margin is required for the ssnip test too.   
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pressure.42  The downward pricing pressure from efficiencies may be mitigated by the
various factors that limit the merger-specificity and cognizability of efficiencies.    
The balance between the upward and downward pricing pressure determines whether the 
merger is likely to raise or lower the prices of the merging firms’ products, ceteris 
paribus. Farrell & Shapiro define their UPP measure as a first-round “net” effect 
measure, as do O’Brien & Salop with respect to their comparable PPI measure.43 
Rather than focus on “net” effects, we take a somewhat different approach here that 
clarifies some of the analytic and measurement issues.  We define “GUPPI” as the 
“Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Index.” GUPPI is intended to measure the upward 
pricing pressure solely from the closeness of substitution between the products of the 
merging firms, before adjusting for the possible mitigating effects of supply side 
responses and other factors, and before netting out the downward pricing pressure.   
In formal terms, the gross upward pricing pressure (in dollar terms) on the price of the 
product produced by merging partner firm-1 as a result of substitution between that 
product and the product sold by its merger partner firm-2 is given by:  
G = DR  × M (1)1  12  2  
where DR12 is the diversion ratio from product-1 to product-2, M2 is the price/cost margin 
of product-2, and x denotes the multiplication (“times”) operator.44  This is what Farrell 
& Shapiro refer to as the “cannibalization effect.”  For example, if DR12=20% and 
M2=$50, then G1=$10. The gross upward pricing pressure for product-2 (in dollar terms) 
is defined similarly as G2 = DR21 x M1. 
Intuitively, the gross upward pricing pressure (G) is the “value of the diversion” to the 
merging partner.  That value is higher when either the diversion ratio is higher, or the 
price/cost margin of the merging partner is higher (or both).  In fact, it is the relevant 
measure of closeness of substitution in the current Merger Guidelines.45  That is, the 
gross upward pricing pressure also is used to rank the next-best substitutes during the 
market definition exercise.
42 See Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic 
Alternative to Market definition, Working Paper (25 November 2008), at 28.  
43  Farrell & Shapiro and O’Brien & Salop do not account for the mitigating effects of potential supply-side
responses (i.e., entry and repositioning).  In addition, these analyses assume that firms behave according to
static Bertrand competition.  If one assumed instead that firms expect other firms to respond to their pricing
initiatives.  These considerations make the analysis more complex, as noted by Farrell & Shapiro, Id. at 14. 
44 We follow Farrell & Shapiro and assume that the merging firms are single-product firms.  “We leave for 
future work how to formally test for UPP for Product 1 in situations where Firm A owns multiple products
that interact on the demand side. While the basic intuition about opportunity cost is robust, this case is 
considerably more technically complex than the one discussed in this paper.”  Id. at 27(n. 76).
45  §1.11(n. 9)(“Throughout the Guidelines, the term "next best substitute" refers to the alternative which, if
available in unlimited quantities at constant prices, would account for the greatest value of diversion of
demand in response to a "small but significant and nontransitory" price increase.” (emphasis added) 
19 
  
 
 
         
 
  
    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
     
 
  
    
   
The gross upward pricing pressure also can be defined using the “percentage margin” 
instead of the “dollar margin.”  This leads to an index that could be used by the Agencies 
as an initial screen for unilateral effects, as we will discuss shortly.  We thus refer to it as 
the “gross upward price pressure index” or “GUPPI” for short: 
GUPPI1 = DR12  ×m2 (2) 
where DR12 is the diversion ratio from product-1 to product-2 and m2 is the percentage
margin of product-2.  This is essentially the “cannibalization tax” on product-1 expressed 
as a percentage of the price of product-2.  For example, if DR12=20% and m2=50%, then 
GUPPI1=10%. The GUPPI for product-2 is defined similarly as GUPPI2 = DR21 x m1.46 
The GUPPI does not purport to be equal to the merger-induced equilibrium price 
increase. It is merely an index of the upward pricing incentive of the merged firm for 
each of its overlap products, holding the prices of other products at pre-merger levels and 
ignoring other factors. (Under certain conditions, however, and ignoring other factors 
discussed below, the GUPPI can be used to obtain a precise measure of the predicted 
“first-round” price increase.47) 
The GUPPI does not account for other factors that affect the upward pricing pressure.  
Nor does it account for the downward pricing pressure caused by efficiencies.  That is 
why it is called the “gross” upward price pressure index.  However, it is worth focusing 
on GUPPI because it is the easiest factor to measure simply and quickly.  Therefore, it is 
a good candidate for an initial screen. However, before discussing the issues related to its 
use as an initial screen or as setting the anticompetitive presumption, we want to start 
with its potential role as relevant evidence of unilateral effects. 
The GUPPI is relevant “circumstantial” evidence of adverse unilateral effects.  The 
GUPPI generally has been used by economists in this way.  But, it is only one factor 
among others.  These other factors also may be very important.  First, the simple GUPPI
formula does not take into account merger-specific efficiencies, such as production cost 
savings and product quality increases.  Second, the GUPPI does not account for several 
other factors that are potentially important, including supply-side responses (i.e., product 
repositioning, uncommitted entry and committed entry), the closeness of other 
substitutes, the multi-product nature of many firms (i.e., the impact on pricing incentives 
of the merged firm’s sales of other substitutable or complementary products), potential 
pricing interdependencies (i.e., how the merging firm’s pricing initiatives might trigger 
46  The GUPPI measure and the UPP test normally are derived and analyzed in the context of the Bertrand
model of price competition with differentiated products. However, similar measures also can be derived in 
the context of the Cournot model of quantity competition.  For details, see the Comment of Serge Moresi
on this issue submitted separately in response to the QFPCs. 
47  For linear demand, the first-round percentage price increase of product-1 would be equal to the GUPPI1 
divided by 2 and then multiplied by the pre-merger price ratio P2/P1. For constant elasticity, the first-round
percentage price increase of product-1 would be equal to the GUPPI1 divided by (1-m1) and then multiplied
by the pre-merger price ratio P2/P1. 
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particular responses by other firms), dynamic demand factors, and the shape of the 
demand curve (i.e., the magnitude of the price effect depends on the curvature of the 
demand function).  Thus, as relevant evidence, the GUPPI would be combined with other 
evidence to form a better prediction.
As we discuss below, more complex PPIs in principle can be explicitly formulated to 
account for efficiencies and some or all of these other factors, but this step raises more
difficult evidentiary issues at the screening stage.  The more complex formulations also 
raise quantification issues, that is, the ability to quantify the factors and in a way that 
allows them to be inserted into a formula, as opposed to taking them into account in a 
more qualitative way. 
Finally, we also want to stress that the use of a measure like GUPPI does not necessarily 
obviate the analysis of the issues normally evaluated in the market definition exercise.  In 
fact, as indicated above, the GUPPI is the measure of closeness of substitution used in 
the ssnip test for determining the next-best substitute product.  The GUPPI also is a close 
cousin of the KSOW market definition methodology discussed above.48  These 
connections serve as an important reminder that market definition analysis also focuses 
on closeness of substitutes, just as does the GUPPI’s diversion ratio.49  The diversion 
ratio is related to the cross-elasticity and own-elasticity of demand.  The importance of 
the cross-elasticity of demand has been used in market definition going back to the 
DuPont decision. The own-elasticity for a group of products forms the backbone of the 
ssnip test. 
2. Using of GUPPI for Determining Presumptions Regarding 
Unilateral Effects
In Section II of these comments, we discussed generally the role of presumptions in 
merger enforcement and merger law.  The GUPPI also might be used for setting 
enforcements thresholds.  For example, a relatively low GUPPI threshold could be used 
to establish a safe harbor for presumptively non-harmful transactions.  A relatively high 
GUPPI threshold could be used to identify presumptively anticompetitive transactions.  
That is, the GUPPI could be used to replace or supplement the HHI thresholds in the 
Merger Guidelines. We believe that most economists would agree that the GUPPI
generally is a better gauge of unilateral effects concerns than the HHI delta.50  The 
48  Suppose for simplicity that the two merging firms earn the same margin, m, and have the same diversion
ratio, DR, between each other.  Using the KSOW test, a ssnip by the two merging products would be
profitable if GUPPI > s*m/(s+m), where s is the ssnip (e.g., 10%).  Note that the Merger Guidelines’ focus 
on profit-maximizing behavior means that the analyst would use the KSOW test with s=10% in order to test
whether the two merging firms would have an incentive to raise price by 5%.  
49  Indeed, it is common for merger analysts to combine market definition and the GUPPI as part of their 
preliminary analysis.  This involves basing diversion ratios on the concept of “proportional diversion,” that
diversion is in proportion to the market shares of the firms in a relevant market, along with analysis that 
takes into account diversion to products outside the relevant market. 
50  In the Cournot model, the weighted average price/cost margin is proportional to the HHI, though the 
HHI delta (based on pre-merger market shares) loses its relevance.  We note that for one particular 
negotiation market situation, the HHI delta is a direct measure of the unilateral effects of a merger among 
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GUPPI could be used alone, or it might be supplemented with the combined market share 
of the merging parties in a well-defined market.    
The best methodology also might vary according to the stage of the merger enforcement 
process. For example, if it is fairly clear that the GUPPI is below a safe harbor level, 
then the Agency might decide not to issue a second request based on unilateral effects 
concerns. (This is the same way in which HHI<1000 is used in the 1992 Merger 
Guidelines, for those matters where the market definition is obvious.)    
Later on in the HSR process, the Agencies could use the GUPPI to determine whether or 
not the merger should be treated as presumptively anticompetitive.51  If the GUPPI
exceeds this level, the burden might shift to the parties to rebut the presumption with 
other evidence. There similarly may be a low GUPPI level where there is a strong 
presumption that the merger does not raise unilateral effects concerns.  (This level would 
not necessarily be the same as the safe harbor level used previously to determine whether 
or not to issue a second request.52) 
One could imagine a sliding scale type of analysis for different values of GUPPI later on 
in the HSR process. For example, there could be three levels in all.53  First, for very low 
GUPPI levels, there might be a strong (irrebuttable or rebuttable) presumption that there 
are no unilateral effects concerns.  Second, there might be a higher GUPPI level, where 
the Agencies conclude that the presumed likelihood of harm is high, but not high enough 
to shift the rebuttal burden to the parties.  Instead, that level may be seen more as a 
statement of information -- that this GUPPI level ordinarily raises significant concerns 
and will require more evidence to alter that expectation.  But, the Agencies might 
continue to bear the burden of supporting or rebutting that concern.  Third, if the GUPPI
is sufficiently higher, then the burden might shift to the merging parties to rebut the 
presumption.54  (The burden of persuasion issue is often an issue of great contention in 
alternative negotiation partners.  For details, see the Comment of Yianis Sarafidis on this issue submitted in 
response to the QFPCs. See also Serge Moresi, Steven C. Salop & Yianis Sarafidis, A Model of Ordered 
Bargaining with Applications, working paper (2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1287224. 
51  At this later stage, the Agencies might want to backstop the GUPPI with market share information.  We 
are not making a recommendation here regarding the precise methodology.  We are just suggesting that
these alternatives be considered as part of the Update process.   
52  The levels would be different because the precision of the GUPPI estimate likely would improve on the
basis of additional information gathered from the second request. 
53 To illustrate with arbitrary HHI numbers, an HHI<1800 might be considered presumptively competitive; 
HHI>2400 might be the point where concerns become very significant but the agencies retain the burden of
persuasion; HH>3000 is the point where the burden shifts to the parties to rebut the presumption.
54  A useful analogy might be to medical tests.  At one end, the physician might conclude that a patient’s
blood pressure is in the “green zone” of good results that indicate no concern.  At the other end, the 
physician may conclude that the patient’s blood pressure crosses the “red line” where medication clearly is 
needed.  In between but moving up towards the red line, the physician may conclude that a “yellow line” 
has been crossed and recommend paying more attention to diet and exercise.  The green line is like the safe 
harbor or presumptively competitive threshold; the yellow line is like the informational presumptive 
threshold; and the red line is like the burden-shifting threshold.
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HSR practice, so it would be beneficial to clarify the Agencies’ intentions in the Update.)   
There also is the question of whether the simple GUPPI formula should be used, or 
whether the GUPPI should be replaced by a PPI that explicitly takes into account some
or all of the other factors. (For example, Farrell & Shapiro’s UPP takes into account an 
“efficiency credit.”) We would not recommend this type of reformulation.  There are too 
many possible factors to include.  Moreover, some of the factors are not so easily 
quantified or cannot be easily inserted into the formula in a simple way.  Finally, each of 
the factors raises evidentiary burdens.  If they were included in the expanded formula, 
then the formula might well lose its utility as a simple, initial screening device, say for 
deciding whether or not to issue a second request.55  We prefer the simple GUPPI
formula, with the other factors then added into the analysis.   
This suggestion does not mean that we think that the other factors are irrelevant.  To the 
contrary, in the ultimate merits analysis, more complex analyses often will be quite 
useful, including the UPP or other variants that take the specific structure of the market 
into account. In fact, these other factors sometimes may be the central issues in the 
ultimate merits analysis.  This analysis also would include evidence specific to the 
merger, rather than just presumptive credits and adjustments like the efficiency credit.
But, we would recommend that the presumption be based on the GUPPI, rather than a
more complex formula.  We feel this is a compromise worth considering in the Update. 
If the GUPPI were given this role as a presumption, the Agencies would need to set the 
thresholds and the strength of the presumption.  As suggested by the long list of factors 
above, setting the threshold would involve more than simply applying an “efficiency 
credit” (whether based on an estimate of the typical variable cost-reduction in horizontal 
mergers, either in general or tailored to particular industries).  (We discuss the efficiency 
credit in more detail in Section VI below.) The other factors also would need to be 
reckoned into the evaluation of the presumption.  It also would be necessary to take into 
account deterrence concerns of the type discussed above in Section II.  While the DOJ 
never fully explained their reasoning, the DOJ may have engaged in some type of similar 
analytic exercise in setting the HHI thresholds in the 1982 Merger Guidelines, perhaps 
based on the agency’s experience in merger analysis.  Of course, elections matter and 
William Baxter’s general antitrust experience and his beliefs about the costs and benefits 
of merger enforcement obviously also played a role.   
If GUPPI (whether alone or in conjunction with the combined market share) is used to 
identify presumptively non-harmful or presumptively anticompetitive transactions for 
enforcement purposes, the Agencies must choose whether to make those presumptions 
rebuttable or irrebuttable. If one or the other presumption is rebuttable, the Agencies also 
55  Of course, some well-counseled firms likely will present evidence on these other factors at an early stage 
in order to convince the Agency not to issue a second request.  If they do, we can see no reason to ignore 
this information and see substantial benefits in considering it.  After all, complying with a second request is 
very expensive for the parties, causes delay and uses up substantial resources of both the Agency and the 
parties. 
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must choose the strength of the presumption – that is, the weight of the “thumb on the 
scale.”  Again, this is the way in which the HHI is used in the current Merger Guidelines.   
We recommend that for the purposes of identifying presumptively anticompetitive 
transactions, the Agencies use some type of sliding scale.  A higher GUPPI should 
require more exculpatory evidence than would a smaller GUPPI. (A sliding scale also 
should apply if other more complex PPIs were used to supplement the analysis.) 
In light of the importance of these other factors, we recommend that the presumption not 
be irrebuttable. We similarly recommend that the presumption of anticompetitive effects 
be modest, except perhaps for the most extreme values.  And, even then, rebuttal should 
be permitted.
V. Coordinated Effects
In these comments, we will only make a few limited observations about coordinated 
effects analysis.   
First, a key issue is the determination of how the proposed merger will maintain or 
increase the likelihood of successful tacit coordination.  However, the Merger Guidelines 
say very little about the incremental impact of the merger on the likelihood of present and 
future coordination, as opposed simply to the impact of the pre-merger market structure.   
More attention should be paid to the incremental impact, including the issue of 
maintenance of a high likelihood of coordination in the future.56 
Second, the coordination “checklist” of coordination hindering and facilitating factors 
does not prioritize the various items.  Nor does it take a critical approach to them, for 
example, by explaining their limitations.  This would be a useful addition, both for the 
parties and the courts. 
Third, every market involves some hindering and some facilitating factors.”  In 
evaluating a merger (say, with a high HHI) against claims that it will lead to likely 
coordinated effects, the relevant issue would be the level of those factors, relative to a
typical merger with that HHI level.  Yet, the Merger Guidelines provide no guidance on 
the typical levels of these factors.  This issue was noted by the courts in HCA57 and 
Heinz.58 
VI. Efficiencies
We have a few comments on the analysis of efficiencies. 
56  For example, see Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Effects 
Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY L.R. 135 (2002). 
57 Supra note 3 at 2. 
58 Supra note 15 at 7.
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A. Efficiencies Presumption, Generally 
Merger law and the Merger Guidelines in principle include two categories of efficiency 
benefits. First, there are the cognizable efficiency benefits analyzed in §4 of the Merger 
Guidelines. Second, there are presumptive efficiency benefits credited to every merger.  
These include the general benefits to society from permitting the transfer of assets from
one party to another that places a higher value on those assets.  They also include the 
benefits that while real, might be impossible to substantiate and verify during the pre-
merger process or that might otherwise not be viewed as cognizable because they likely 
would not be shared with consumers.   
Since the 1997 Efficiencies Revision to the Merger Guidelines, there has been some
economic research claiming that the efficiency benefits often claimed for mergers are 
overstated. For example, as summarized in the recent article of Baker & Shapiro,59 
There is considerable evidence, moreover, that acquiring firms are 
systematically overoptimistic about the efficiencies they can achieve 
through acquisition. Evidence from the finance, managerial, and 
economics literatures show that many mergers do not work out well, either 
in terms of shareholder value or organizationally.  This evidence supports 
the view that many mergers are motivated by managerial hubris, perhaps 
exacerbated by distorted managerial compensation schemes, and that 
managers often underestimate integration problems. This evidence 
certainly does not support the view that merger-specific efficiencies are 
common or that claims of efficiencies made by merging parties should 
generally be credited. Some mergers are undoubtedly motivated by the 
pursuit of genuine efficiencies and go on to generate them. But we caution 
that arguments by merging firms that efficiencies will enhance their ability
and incentive to compete, resulting in lower prices, higher quality or new 
products, should not be accepted based solely on their plausibility, but 
only after careful analysis. 
It seems clear that the Agencies must review this evidence to evaluate how, if at 
all, it should alter the permissiveness of merger enforcement policy and the 
GUPPI and/or HHI thresholds. 
B.  The Efficiency Credit for Unilateral Effects
One of the other factors discussed above with respect to using the GUPPI (either as
relevant evidence or for setting the presumptions) is the evaluation is the level of
expected efficiencies, what Farrell and Shapiro call the “efficiency credit.”  Purely for 
illustrative purposes, Farrell and Shapiro used an efficiency credit of 10%.60  In their 
59  Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, in HOW THE
CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK 235, 2-56 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008). 
60 See Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic 
Alternative to Market Definition (Working Paper, 25 November 2008;UC Berkeley Dept. of Econ.) at 10. 
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formulation, when the GUPPI is used as relevant evidence, and in the absence of 
evidence on the cognizable efficiencies from the merger, the Agencies would apply a 
“standard deduction.” However, the merging parties instead could provide evidence of a 
large cognizable cost-savings, what Farrell & Shapiro refer to as an “itemized deduction.”   
There are several issues to note here.   
First, Farrell & Shapiro give the parties a choice between the “standard deduction” and 
itemizing the cognizable efficiencies.  Farrell & Shapiro do not make any adjustment to 
account for non-cognizable efficiencies.  Nor do they make explicit adjustment for 
optimal deterrence in their analysis.  In our view, both those adjustments should be made 
for the reasons discussed above. Deterrence and general efficiencies concerns also would 
have to be included somehow in the standard deduction.  But, that would mean that 
parties who opt for itemizing cognizable efficiencies potentially would lose those 
adjustments.  To correct this problem, the Agencies should consider crediting the parties 
for the general efficiencies and optimal deterrence factors, whether or not they opt for 
itemizing the cognizable efficiencies.61 
Second, Farrell & Shapiro formulate the efficiency credit as a fraction of the variable 
costs of the merging firms.  This is not an innocuous choice. It means that the credit 
declines in importance as the price/cost margin rises.  For example, consider a product 
with zero variable costs; it would obtain no efficiency credit.  This might be a reasonable 
choice if all efficiency benefits involved cost reductions.  But, efficiency benefits may 
involve quality improvements too.  Quality improvements often increase consumers’ 
willingness to pay for the product, and thus can be measured as a percentage of the price 
of the product. However, it is more complicated than that because the merged firm might 
have the incentive to raise its nominal price by the amount of the quality increase in order 
to maintain a constant quality-adjusted price.62  In that situation, consumer surplus may 
increase, even if the quality-adjusted price does not change.63  In fact, an increase in 
product quality may lead to higher consumer welfare even if the quality-adjusted price 
increases. This analysis raises the caution that a reformulation of the UPP test in terms 
of “upward quality-adjusted price pressure” could be potentially misleading because a 
higher quality-adjusted price does not necessarily imply consumer harm. 
61  In this sense, the efficiency credit would be more like the “personal exemption” than the “standard 
deduction.” 
62 We have been working on this issue, though our work remains unpublished. In that regard, consider a 
firm facing the demand function q = 2 – p/z, where q denotes the quantity sold, p denotes the price charged 
by the firm, and z denotes the quality of the firm’s product.  Suppose that the marginal cost of production is 
zero. Then, the profit-maximizing price is p = z.  Thus, the equilibrium quality-adjusted price is p/z = 1. It 
would follow that, if the quality of the product increases, the firm would raise price proportionally and
hence the quality-adjusted price would not change.   
63  In the example of the previous footnote, consumer surplus is equal to z/2 in equilibrium.  Therefore, 
following an increase in quality, consumer surplus would increase even though the firm raises price and the 
quality-adjusted price does not change. 
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Subject to that caution, these observations suggest that the efficiency credit might be set 
as a fraction of price (not cost) for industries where mergers are likely to generate quality 
improvements.  It also suggests the efficiency credit might have two parts, one relating to 
cost-savings and another relating to quality-improvements.       
Third, to repeat the discussion in the previous section, the analysis should not be limited 
solely to a narrowly defined efficiency credit.  The impact of the other market factors and 
deterrence concerns also should be taken into account in setting the GUPPI presumption 
thresholds (both the “safe harbor” and the “presumptively anticompetitive” thresholds.)
C. Anticompetitive Efficiency Claims
There is a historical antitrust concern that efficiencies may have anticompetitive effects.  
It sometimes used to be argued that the dominant “price leader” with significantly lower 
cost could threaten to “discipline” smaller rivals that tried to challenge its dominance by 
competing harder.  This disciplining behavior would involve setting off a price war that 
would drive its smaller, higher cost rivals into a below-cost position but would continue 
to earn a positive profit for itself.  In Brown Shoe, efficiencies were seen potentially as 
part of the antitrust “offense” rather than being a “defense” to claims that the merger 
would harm consumers.   
These same concerns in principle also can arise in the modern competitive effects 
analysis of the Merger Guidelines. In the context of coordinated effects, if a merger leads 
the merged firm to reduce its costs, such cost reductions could increase the likelihood of 
a successful coordinated outcome.  The reasoning is that non-merging maverick firms 
might fear that a lower cost merged firm would have greater ability and incentive to 
retaliate (and retaliate harder) against maverick rivals’ price cuts.  This increased ability 
in turn could deter such maverick price cuts and thereby increase the likelihood of the 
coordinated outcome.  This is simply a modern, game-theoretic rendering of the old 
“disciplining” story. 
A variant of this concern applied to oligopoly interaction actually was alleged in the 
DOJ’s Competitive Impact Statement for the Premdor/Masonite merger.64  The DOJ 
apparently was concerned that by creating a vertically integrated firm with lower costs, 
the merger would facilitate coordination with the leading firm, which also was vertically 
integrated. The DOJ stated this concern about cost-reductions reducing the incentives to 
cut price as follows: “In fact, Masonite recognized that the [rival] firm's incentive to gain 
market share by lowering price would diminish if it faced a strong, integrated 
competitor.”65 
Of course, this issue is complicated.  It would matter whether the cost reductions are 
obtained by the “maverick” or by a “cartel enforcer.”  On the one hand, it would be 
64  Competitive Impact Statement at 16-17, U.S. v. Premdor, Inc., No. 2002 WL 1816981, (D.D.C. 2002) 
(No. 1:1CV01696). We were economic consultants to Masonite on this matter. 
65 Id. at 16. 
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procompetitive for a "maverick" to get lower costs, because lowered costs enhance its 
incentive to cheat on the coordinated agreement.  On the other hand, it would be 
potentially anticompetitive for a "cartel enforcer" to get lower costs because its lowered 
costs increase the likelihood and severity of its retaliation against price cuts by the 
maverick.  (For these purposes, the “cartel enforcer” may refer to all the non-maverick 
firms or just the single firm most likely to detect and take action against a defecting 
maverick.)  And, of course, this analysis is not limited to explicit cartels but applies to 
tacit coordination as well.66 
Cost reductions also can reduce the likelihood that fear of entry would constrain post-
merger prices.  This is because lower cost incumbents would increase the intensity of 
post-entry competition.  The fear of heightened post-entry competition can act as an entry 
deterrent.67 
We certainly are not suggesting that antitrust return to those yesteryear days of Brown 
Shoe or Procter and Gamble.68  We are suggesting, however, that the Guidelines Update 
might address this issue.  In principle, there are at least three alternative approaches that 
might be taken.  First, the Agencies might conclude that these anticompetitive effects are 
sufficiently unlikely that these concerns should be viewed as irrebuttably non-cognizable, 
and suggest that courts do the same. Second, the Agencies might conclude that there 
should be a strong but rebuttable presumption that efficiencies are procompetitive, and 
the plaintiff would have a heavy burden of proof to establish the likelihood of the 
anticompetitive effect with a substantial degree of certainty.  Third the Agencies might 
conclude that anticompetitive efficiencies represent a significant concern that warrants 
detailed analysis in every matter and/or that efficiencies should be further discounted as a 
result. We would not recommend the latter approach.   
66   See Baker, supra note 58. 
67  The idea that more intense post-entry competition would reduce the likelihood of entry is part of the 
analysis of the “likely entry” prong of the easy entry standard in the Merger Guidelines. See also Steven C.
Salop, Measuring Ease of Entry, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 552 (1986).
68  FTC v. Procter and Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967). 
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